

An Extensive Review on Smart Grid Technologies: Recent Advancements, Key Challenges, and Future Directions

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Abstract - This review examines smart-grid technologies that connect sensing, communication, analytics and control across electricity networks. It synthesizes one broad review with four supporting studies on district-energy control, ANN-based distribution planning, machine-learning cybersecurity and urban energy modelling. The literature points to practical gains in visibility and coordination, especially as distributed generation, storage and flexible demand grow. It also shows that these gains depend on data quality, interoperability, secure operation and validation under real network conditions. Smart meters and PMUs improve observability; predictive models and learning methods can support planning and control; sector-coupled models widen the planning boundary. Cybersecurity, privacy, legacy integration, cost and uneven evidence remain central constraints. The review concludes that integrated field pilots, transparent benchmarks and resilience-focused design are needed before isolated technology demonstrations can support broad deployment.

Key Words: Smart grid, advanced metering infrastructure, distributed energy resources, artificial neural network, cybersecurity, machine learning, district heating, urban energy modelling

1. INTRODUCTION

Electric power networks are being asked to accommodate variable renewable generation, distributed energy resources (DERs), electric vehicles, storage and more active consumers. A conventional grid was designed mainly for centralized generation and one-way delivery. A smart grid adds sensing, communication and automated control so operators can observe changing conditions and coordinate resources across generation, transmission, distribution and customer systems [1].

“Smart grid” has no single universal definition. In this review it refers to an electricity system that combines bidirectional power and information flows with monitoring, control, interoperability and cybersecurity. Digital equipment alone does not make a grid smart: measurements must be timely and trustworthy, and control actions must remain safe under normal operation and disturbances [1].




Fig. 1. From a one-way utility network to a coordinated smart grid

1.1 Review scope and method

This paper is a narrative synthesis of the supplied 2023 smart-grid review and four supporting papers. The main review provides the organizing account of grid architecture, meters, communication, automation and security [1]. The supporting studies examine predictive control in district-heating networks [2], ANN-based distribution planning [3], machine learning and cybersecurity [4], and energy-performance modelling in urban design [5]. The papers differ in date, system boundary and method; their results are therefore discussed in context rather than pooled as a common dataset.

The synthesis compares what each technology measures, what decision it supports and what conditions limit deployment. It does not report new experiments, field measurements or a systematic database search. Figures in this paper are original explanatory diagrams made from the cited descriptions; they are not reproduced source figures.

The papers are complementary rather than directly comparable. The broad 2023 review maps technologies and implementation concerns across the grid [1]. The ANN paper focuses on a distribution-planning task and reports a proposed operational scheme [3]. The district-heating paper uses system modelling and operator support for electricity and thermal production [2]. The cybersecurity survey examines both using ML to defend systems and protecting ML itself [4]. The urban-design paper proposes linking design computation with energy optimization [5]. These differences matter when drawing conclusions: a

review, a proposed algorithm and a modelling framework answer different questions.

2. SMART-GRID ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION

A smart grid is a socio-technical system. Physical assets move electricity; sensors and meters describe system state; communication networks carry measurements and commands; applications convert data into operating decisions. Markets, service providers, utilities and customers interact through this infrastructure. The architecture must define both technical interfaces and the responsibilities of the actors that use them [1].




Fig. 2. Closed-loop sensing, decision and control cycle (synthesized from

2.1 Functional domains and feedback

Generation and storage supply energy; transmission moves bulk power; distribution connects substations, DERs and customers. Operations coordinate the physical system, while market and service functions support transactions, forecasts and customer programmes. These domains overlap in practice. A distribution management system may need meter data from customers, status from DER controllers and limits from transmission operators before it can safely change local settings [1].

Architecture is useful only when it resolves practical interfaces. A planning team needs to identify which device owns each measurement, how often it is refreshed, which system is authoritative for equipment state and who may issue a control command. The same signal may be consumed by protection, operations and customer programmes, each with distinct timing and safety needs. A common conceptual model helps organize these interactions, but local implementation still requires tested mappings between device data, utility applications and operating procedures [1].




Fig. 3. Functional domains and their coordination in a smart-grid architecture

The operating loop begins with measurement. Smart meters report consumption and, in advanced deployments, receive configuration or control messages. Substation sensors and phasor measurement units (PMUs) provide additional views of equipment and network dynamics. Communication transports this information to applications that estimate state, forecast demand or detect abnormal conditions. Control commands then alter generation, switching, voltage settings or flexible demand; subsequent measurements show whether the action had the intended effect [1].




Fig. 4. Metering evolution: data collection expands toward two-way control

2.2 Metering and communication

Automatic meter reading (AMR) primarily supports remote collection of meter records. Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) adds two-way communication and can support time-based tariffs, remote configuration and demand-response functions. These capabilities depend on reliable communications, device identity, data quality and clear rules for customer access. More frequent and granular readings improve operational visibility but also increase the volume and sensitivity of data that utilities must protect [1].

Smart appliances extend the customer side of this architecture. They can expose load status or respond to schedules, tariffs and control signals. Their contribution depends on user settings, device compatibility and the ability to preserve service needs. A water heater or building control system may offer flexible timing, while a

medical or comfort-critical load may not. Customer participation should therefore be represented as constrained flexibility, rather than treating all demand as equally controllable [1].




Fig. 5. Simplified advanced metering information path

No single communication technology fits every grid function. Protection and wide-area monitoring may require predictable delay and high availability; meter backhaul can prioritize broad coverage and cost; field devices may use wired or wireless links depending on geography and retrofit needs. Interoperability is a system property: compatible data models, time references, security controls and tested interfaces matter alongside the physical link [1].

Communication design also has a failure mode: a delayed or corrupted message can be more harmful than a missing message if a controller interprets it as current. Systems should attach quality and time information to measurements, reject stale commands and provide safe local behavior during a network outage. Redundant paths can improve availability where the service warrants the cost. The required level of redundancy should follow the consequence of failure, rather than applying the same design to every meter and control function [1].




Fig. 6. Communication layers must meet grid timing, coverage and interoperability needs

3. RECENT TECHNOLOGY DIRECTIONS

3.1 Distribution intelligence and artificial intelligence

High DER penetration changes distribution voltage and power-flow patterns. Qudaih and Mitani describe an ANN-based operational scheme that monitors voltage profiles

under load changes and selects distributed-generation output to improve controllability [3]. This is a targeted planning and control proposal, not evidence that one neural-network design will generalize to every feeder. Training scenarios, network models, sensor coverage and operating constraints shape its usefulness.

The cited ANN work uses a radial-basis-function neural-network approach within its proposed scheme [3]. In general, a planning model can use load and generation scenarios with network measurements to estimate voltage behavior, then evaluate candidate DER outputs against engineering limits. Such an estimate can narrow the set of operating choices, but the utility must still check power-flow feasibility and protection settings. Neural-network output should be treated as decision support unless the complete controller has been tested and approved for automatic action.

Before deployment, the training and evaluation sets should be separated by time or scenario so that near-duplicate operating points do not make performance appear stronger than it is. Validation should include high and low demand, reverse power flow, forecast error and missing sensor readings where relevant. Results should be compared with the existing engineering method and reported in terms that operators can interpret, such as constraint violations or decision error. The supplied ANN study motivates this direction, but does not establish a universal benchmark across utilities [3].




Fig. 7. ANN-based voltage monitoring and distributed-generation planning concept

Machine learning can support forecasting, anomaly detection and condition monitoring when operating data are abundant. Yet model performance can change as loads, equipment, weather or attack tactics change. A grid application therefore needs validation on representative conditions, monitoring for drift, fallback control and human oversight for consequential actions. Wazid et al. discuss the two-way relationship between cybersecurity and machine learning: ML can aid defense, while data or models can themselves be attacked [4].

The interaction is important because detection systems learn patterns from historical traffic and operating records. If attack examples are absent from training, or if normal

operating patterns change, the detector may miss events or produce excessive alerts. ML-based security should therefore be evaluated against changing conditions, deliberate evasion and the operational cost of false alarms. Human analysts need enough context to investigate an alert, while automated containment must avoid interrupting legitimate grid functions. These controls complement, rather than replace, secure configuration and access management [4].




Fig. 8. Machine learning can support detection while creating model and data risks

3.2 Smart substations and wide-area monitoring

Digital substations bring protection, measurement and supervisory functions onto connected platforms. PMUs add time-aligned phasor measurements that can help operators assess wide-area behavior. These technologies can improve situational awareness, but they also increase dependence on accurate time, communications and configuration management. The value of a sensor is limited if its reading cannot be trusted or interpreted consistently by downstream systems [1].

A substation modernization can consolidate status and control information, support remote diagnostics and improve coordination with a control centre. The transition also concentrates more functions on digital platforms. Device inventories, configuration backups, authenticated maintenance and tested recovery plans become part of reliability engineering. When new equipment is introduced, operators need training and clear procedures for distinguishing sensor faults, communication faults and physical equipment problems [1].




Fig. 9. Substation automation links protection, measurements and supervisory control




Fig. 10. Phasor measurement concept for time-aligned wide-area monitoring

PMU usefulness depends on synchronized clocks, suitable placement and a communications path that preserves measurement timing. Wide-area measurements can help reveal oscillatory or abnormal behavior that local monitoring may not show, but they add data-handling and validation requirements. A phasor record should be interpreted with its quality flags and operating context. The 2023 review discusses PMUs among smart-grid technologies; the supplied sources do not give a common field dataset from which to quantify their impact [1].

3.3 Flexible demand, storage and sector coupling

Demand response can shift or reduce consumption when system conditions, tariffs or service needs change. Storage can absorb excess generation and return energy later, while distributed solar and wind alter local net demand. Coordinating these resources can reduce operational stress, but control must account for customer constraints, network limits and the availability of the resource. A smart meter or price signal alone does not guarantee a useful or equitable response [1].

Storage can provide several services depending on its power, energy capacity, state of charge and location. It may shift energy over time or support local voltage and reliability objectives, but those services compete for the same asset and may have different operating horizons. DER coordination should account for feeder constraints and avoid assuming that nameplate capacity is always available. The grid operator, aggregator and customer may also have different priorities, so dispatch rules and settlement need to be explicit [1].




Fig. 11. Distributed energy resources coordinated at the distribution level (synthesized from

The district-heating study illustrates why energy-system boundaries matter. Neuman, Pokorny and Weiglhofer describe modelling electricity and heat production, forecasting demand using weather information and supporting operators with optimized control strategies [2]. Thermal networks have delays and inertia, so an action that is appropriate for an electrical timescale may not suit heat delivery. Coordinated models can make these interactions visible, but their recommendations remain dependent on model assumptions and input forecasts.

The district-heating study describes modelling the supply system as a whole and using predicted outdoor conditions and consumer heat demand to evaluate control strategies [2]. Heat transport has delay and thermal inertia, so operators cannot assume that an electrical dispatch change immediately produces a corresponding change in delivered heat. A model can compare alternative plant configurations and provide decision support, while the operator retains responsibility for selecting actions under current conditions. This is a useful example of how smart-grid principles extend beyond electricity meters into coupled energy services [2].




Fig. 12. Predictive control loop for coupled electricity and district-heating systems

3.4 Urban-scale energy performance

Urban design affects energy demand through form, density and the arrangement of buildings and infrastructure. Yang and Yan propose linking an urban-design computational model with an energy-process optimization model so that design alternatives can be assessed for energy performance [5]. This perspective broadens smart-grid planning: network upgrades and demand flexibility should be considered alongside the built environment that shapes future loads.

The urban-design proposal emphasizes a difference between choosing a physical form and evaluating how an energy system performs. Its proposed link between an Urban Design Computational Model and an Optimization Model of Energy Process can make energy performance part of the design comparison [5]. The authors identify evidence-based work on community-level near-zero-energy districts as a future need. This is a research

direction, not a reported demonstration that a specific urban design achieved a measured energy outcome [5].

3.5 Customer devices and high-capacity assets

Smart appliances can shift selected tasks using preset preferences or price information, which may help reduce coincident peak demand [1]. Their use must preserve user control and distinguish flexible appliances from loads that cannot safely be interrupted. A grid programme also needs a communication path, an understandable customer interface and a way to verify that the requested response occurred. Without these conditions, a theoretical flexible load may not be available when operators need it.

The 2023 review also discusses superconducting cables as a high-capacity, low-loss transmission technology [1]. Their practical value depends on the full installation, including monitoring, fault detection and cooling requirements; the supplied review notes that mature room-temperature applications are not available. This example shows why component-level performance is insufficient for technology selection. Utilities must compare installation and operating needs with the corridor's capacity problem, maintenance capability and alternatives such as network reinforcement or local flexibility [1].




Fig. 13. Coupling urban design choices with energy-performance modelling

4. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

4.1 Cybersecurity, privacy and resilience

Connected meters, substations, control centres and third-party services expand the attack surface. Threats can target availability, integrity, confidentiality or physical operation; a cyber incident may disrupt monitoring or trigger unsafe control. The 2023 review identifies security as a central implementation issue [1]. Wazid et al. show that ML-based detection has its own vulnerabilities, including risks to training data and models [4]. A defense strategy should combine asset inventory, access control, secure communications, segmentation, anomaly monitoring, incident response and recovery exercises.

Security controls should reflect the grid's operating hierarchy. Field devices need authenticated identities and tightly scoped privileges; engineering workstations and remote-access paths need monitoring; control centres need protected backups and rehearsed recovery. Supplier access and software updates should be governed because maintenance links can bridge otherwise separated networks. Detection can combine rules and learning methods, but the response plan should account for the possibility that an alert is wrong or that the monitoring service itself is unavailable [1], [4].




Fig. 14. Security lifecycle for connected grid assets (synthesized from

Meter data can reveal household routines and occupancy patterns. Utilities therefore need purpose limits, retention controls, access logging and transparent customer protections. Security and privacy are related but not interchangeable: encryption may protect data in transit while leaving questions about collection, inference and secondary use unresolved. Resilience also requires safe local operation when communications or central services are unavailable [1], [4].

Privacy governance should describe which readings are collected, how long they are retained, who can access them and what uses require customer notice or consent. Aggregation can reduce exposure for some analyses, although it may also remove detail needed for specific operating tasks. Access logs and role-based permissions help make use auditable. These measures should be designed with the meter programme, because privacy controls added after broad data collection may not address the original purpose and retention choices [1].

4.2 Interoperability, cost and legacy systems

Utilities often integrate equipment from different generations and suppliers. Incompatible protocols, data meanings or update practices can make nominally connected devices difficult to operate as one system. Retrofitting legacy assets also competes with reliability work and capital budgets. Standards can reduce integration risk, but conformance testing and clear governance are needed to ensure that implementations behave consistently across vendors and jurisdictions [1].

Interoperability is not achieved by selecting one communications protocol. Equipment may exchange messages yet disagree about units, timestamps, alarm meaning or the ownership of a control action. Utilities need conformance tests, version management and procedures for staged upgrades. For older assets that cannot support modern security features, gateways and compensating controls can reduce exposure, but they introduce additional maintenance and monitoring. A long-term plan should track when legacy components can be replaced and how their risks are managed in the meantime [1].

Smart-grid benefits may be uneven if communication coverage, technical skills or investment are concentrated in well-resourced areas. Customer-facing programmes require understandable terms and accessible participation. Planning should examine who receives service improvements, who bears equipment or data costs, and how essential service continues during outages. The supplied studies identify technical opportunities, but they do not provide a shared empirical basis for comparing distributional outcomes across regions [1–5].

4.3 Data, models and evidence quality

ANN and optimization approaches depend on data that represent operating conditions and on models that capture relevant network constraints [2], [3], [5]. Missing measurements, biased samples or changing behavior can create confident but unsuitable recommendations. Simulation is useful for exploring options; it is not a substitute for field validation. Reports should state system boundaries, assumptions, baselines, uncertainty and the conditions under which a method was tested.

Evidence should be read according to the method used. A review organizes prior work but may not measure the performance of a particular device. A simulation explores stated assumptions; a field pilot tests an implementation under local operating conditions. An ANN proposal can show that a method is computationally feasible for its study setup without proving reliable operation across unseen feeders. A planning model can compare alternatives while remaining sensitive to demand forecasts and system boundaries [1–5].




Fig. 15. Research priorities synthesized from the reviewed evidence

5. INTEGRATED REVIEW FRAMEWORK

The evidence supports a layered deployment logic. First, define the service need and system boundary. Then establish trustworthy measurements and interoperable interfaces. Next, test analytics and control against network limits, forecast errors and communication failures. Finally, validate the full workflow with operators and customers, including privacy, security and recovery requirements. This sequence connects technology choices to an operating purpose and makes limitations visible before wide deployment [1–5].

5.1 Coordinating operating timescales

Grid functions operate on different timescales. Protection may need a rapid local response; distribution dispatch may use updated measurements and forecasts; customer programmes often schedule demand over longer intervals. District-heating control adds slower thermal dynamics and transport delays [2]. An integrated design should specify which decisions remain local, which are coordinated centrally and how conflicting setpoints are resolved. Safe fallback behavior should be defined for each layer so that loss of a cloud service or communication link does not disable essential protection or local control [1], [2].

5.2 Technology selection and evaluation

Technology selection should begin with the operating problem. A utility seeking better voltage visibility may prioritize measurement placement and distribution analytics [3]; a system facing uncertain heat demand may need predictive modelling and operator support [2]; a customer programme may depend on AMI and appliance controls [1]. Evaluation can then track relevant indicators such as measurement coverage, constraint violations, forecast error, response availability, false alarms, restoration time and customer participation. These indicators should be compared with a stated baseline and reported with uncertainty. A single headline efficiency figure cannot represent security, reliability and service quality at once.

5.3 Governance and responsibility

Integrated operation also requires clear responsibility for data quality, model updates, control authority and incident response. Utilities and vendors should agree on configuration ownership, software support periods and the evidence required before a model or device is allowed to influence operations. Customers need understandable information about automated demand response and the ability to set appropriate limits. Regulators and planners can use transparent evaluations to compare public benefits with investment and privacy costs. These governance tasks

are part of implementation because the smart grid crosses organizational boundaries as well as technical ones [1], [4], [5].

A practical validation sequence begins with offline replay of representative data, then a digital or hardware-in-the-loop environment, followed by a limited pilot with operator approval. At each stage, the team should test sensor loss, stale data, model drift, communication interruption and recovery. Acceptance criteria should cover both technical behavior and operating burden: how often alerts need review, whether actions respect network limits and how quickly service returns after a fault. This sequence is a proposed synthesis for evaluation, not a procedure tested by the supplied papers.

For example, a distribution-planning application could combine meter and PMU measurements with forecasts of local generation and demand. An ANN may estimate voltage or suggest a candidate DER dispatch [3], while a network model checks feasibility. Security monitoring should verify data provenance and model behavior [4]. If the area also contains district heating, thermal constraints and weather-dependent demand should be represented separately before coordinating electric and heat production [2]. These components form a testable workflow, not a claim of demonstrated system-wide performance.

6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Field pilots should test complete workflows rather than isolated algorithms: sensors, communications, models, operator interfaces and recovery procedures must work together. Published evaluations should include baselines, geographic and seasonal coverage, failure cases, uncertainty and cybersecurity tests. Shared benchmarks would help compare ANN and other forecasting or control methods without overstating results from a single feeder or simulation [2–4].

Interoperability research should pair standards with implementation testing across vendors and legacy equipment. Privacy-preserving data access, secure model updates and explainable operator support deserve evaluation under realistic utility constraints. Urban energy models should connect building and land-use scenarios to distribution planning while reporting how assumptions affect results [1], [4], [5].

Urban-scale analysis can become more useful when its assumptions are connected to utility planning data. Building demand profiles, land-use alternatives and local generation scenarios can be translated into feeder-level loads for network studies. The models should retain uncertainty in occupancy, weather and technology uptake

rather than reporting one deterministic future. Collaboration between planners, utilities and communities is needed to ensure that a high-performance design remains serviceable and accessible after construction [5].

Research should also examine customer participation and regional deployment conditions. Flexible demand, storage and DER programmes need measures of reliability, affordability and service access alongside technical performance. For coupled electricity and heat networks, work should quantify the consequences of forecast errors, thermal delays and alternative control arrangements [2].

Future studies should publish enough detail to reproduce a comparison: system topology, data period, measurement quality, control constraints, forecast inputs and the baseline method. Results should separate simulated outcomes from observations and state the limits of transfer to other systems. For ML, authors should disclose how training and test scenarios were selected and how models are monitored after deployment. For sector-coupled models, the timing and physical constraints of each energy carrier should be described [2–5].

6.1 Deployment pathway and transferability

A deployment plan can stage changes according to their dependence on other capabilities. Better asset records, metering and communication interfaces establish the data foundation; tested distribution automation and operator tools can then use that information. Forecasting or ML support should be added only with clear validation, fallback and model-maintenance arrangements [1], [3], [4]. Higher-capital options such as superconducting transmission require a separate corridor and lifecycle assessment [1]. This sequence is a planning aid, not a universal maturity ranking, because utility needs and existing infrastructure differ.

Pilot findings should be transferred cautiously. A method validated on one feeder may face different topology, DER mix, weather and communication coverage elsewhere. Replication should therefore include more than one operating context and state what changed between trials. For urban energy planning, comparison across community scenarios can help expose sensitivity to land-use and demand assumptions [5]. For heat networks, the forecast horizon and thermal delays should be documented [2]. Transferable evidence will come from reporting both successful operation and the conditions that limited it.

6.2 Regional planning & policy coordination:

Deployment priorities should reflect local system conditions. A region with aging distribution assets may first need reliable monitoring and protection upgrades;

another with rapid DER growth may need stronger forecasting and coordination between distribution and transmission operators. District-heating networks are relevant in some urban areas but not others [2]. Planning should therefore describe the existing asset base, climate, demand profile, communication coverage and workforce capacity before transferring a technology package from a different setting [1], [5].

Public policy and utility procurement can support this work by requiring interoperable interfaces, clear data protections and evidence that proposed functions meet an operating need. Cost comparisons should include installation, maintenance, communications, cybersecurity and replacement over the asset lifecycle. Customer programmes should report participation and service effects, not assume that every household can respond equally. These steps can help align investment with reliability and access goals while preserving room for regional differences [1], [4].

A shared evaluation record would make research more useful to planners. Alongside algorithm accuracy, reports can state the feeder or urban system studied, the time period and operating scenarios, data gaps, security assumptions, baseline practice and limits on generalization. Results from proposed control, simulation and field operation should be labeled separately. Such reporting would let utilities compare evidence without implying that studies with different boundaries establish the same level of readiness [1–5].

7. CONCLUSION

Smart grids combine physical infrastructure with sensing, communication, analytics and control. The reviewed work shows how AMI, PMUs, distribution automation, ANN planning, predictive heat-network control, cybersecurity methods and urban energy modelling can contribute to a more observable and flexible system [1–5]. Their value depends on trustworthy data, interoperable equipment, sound models and operating procedures that remain safe when components fail.

The literature also cautions against treating digitization as an outcome by itself. Cybersecurity, privacy, cost, legacy integration and evidence quality shape what can be deployed responsibly. Progress will require system-level pilots and transparent evaluations that connect technical performance with customer and operator needs. The supplied papers establish useful directions, while leaving substantial work in field validation and integrated planning.

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